Vanderbilt University Law School
Randall S. Thomas
John S. Beasley II Professor of Law and Business Director, Law & Business Program Director, LL.M. Program Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice Program Professor of Management
Voice: (615) 343-3814
Fax: (615) 322-6631
Email: randall.thomas@vanderbilt.edu
Office: Room 236
View curriculum vitae (.pdf)
Links
Research Interest(s)
Shareholder activism, corporate and securities litigation, executive compensation, corporate voting
Education
Ph.D. (Economics), J.D. University of Michigan
B.A. Haverford College
Biography
Randall Thomas has earned a reputation of being one of the most productive and thoughtful corporate and securities law scholars in the nation. His recent work addresses issues such as hedge fund shareholder activism, executive compensation, corporate voting, corporate litigation and the structure of firms. He joined the Vanderbilt law faculty in 2000 to develop and direct the Law & Business Program, having served previously in on the law faculties of the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan, Duke University, Boston University, and the University of Washington. Prior to teaching law, Professor Thomas was in private practice for four years, and clerked for U.S. District Judge Charles Joiner of the Eastern District of Michigan. An acclaimed teacher, Professor Thomas teaches courses in the area of corporate law, including corporations and securities regulation and directs the law school's LL.M. program and its Summer in Venice academic program.
Representative Publications
Articles
"Does Private Equity Create Wealth?", 76 University of Chicago Law Review 219 (2009) (with Ronald Masulis)
"Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance," 63 Journal of Finance 1729 (2008) (with Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and Frank Partnoy)
"Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation," in New Financial Instruments and Institutions, Brookings Institute (2007)
"Shareholder Proposals in the New Millenium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reactions," 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 368 (2007) (with James Cotter)
"Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions," 106 Columbia Law Review 1587 (2006) (with James Cox)
"Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements," 58 Stanford Law Review 411 (2005) (with James Cox). Selected as one of the Best Corporate and Securities Articles of 2006, by Corporate Practice Commentator.
"Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation," 103 Michigan Law Review 1142 (2005) (Annual Book Review Survey) (with John Core and Wayne Guay)
"What Do CEOs Bargain For?: An Empirical Study of Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts," 63 Washington & Lee Law Review 231 (2005) (with Stewart J. Schwab)
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