David E. Lewis
Professor of Political Science Professor of Law
Voice: 615-322-6228
Email: david.e.lewis@vanderbilt.edu
View curriculum vitae (.pdf)
Personal Website
Research Interest(s)
The presidency, executive branch politics, and public administration
Education
Ph.D., M.A. Stanford University
M.A. University of Colorado - Boulder
B.A. University of California - Berkeley
Biography
David Lewis' research interests include the presidency, executive branch politics and public administration. He is the author of Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (Stanford University Press, 2003) and numerous articles on American politics, public administration and management. His most recent book, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton University Press, 2008), analyzes the causes and consequences of presidential politicization of the executive branch. The book received the Herbert A. Simon Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association's Public Administration Section and the Richard E. Neustadt Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association's Presidency Research Section. His current projects explore the political views of government agencies and their employees, the politics of presidential appointments, and various aspects of public sector management performance. Before joining Vanderbilt's Department of Political Science in fall 2008, he was assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, where he was affiliated with the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, from 2002-08. He began his academic career at the College of William and Mary, where he was an assistant professor in the Department of Government from 2000-02.
Representative Publications
Books
The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance, Princeton University Press (2008) (Winner, Herbert A. Simon Best Book Award by Public Administration Section, American Political Science Association)
Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997, Stanford University Press (2003) (Paperback edition 2004)
Articles
“Struggling Over Bureaucracy: The Levers of Control,” In Michael Nelson, ed. The Presidency and the Political System, 9th ed. (CQ Press, 2009) (with Terry M. Moe)
"Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence," Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (1): 60-73 (2009)
"Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage, and Administrative Competence," Presidential Studies Quarterly (forthcoming 2009)
"Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences," 16(1) Political Analysis 3 (2008) (with Joshua D. Clinton)
"Management and Leadership Performance in the Defense Department: Evidence from Surveys of Federal Employees," 34:4 Armed Forces and Society 639 (2008) (with Mayor Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army)
"Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design," 88:2 Boston University Law Review 459 (2008) (with Neal Devins)
"Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Re-Evaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis," 70(1) Journal of Politics 1 (2008) (with Brandice Canes-Wrone and William G. Howell)
"Testing Pendleton's Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?" 69(4) Journal of Politics 1073 (2007)
"Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Examination of OMB's PART Scores," 66(5) Public Administration Review 742 (2006) (with John B. Gilmour)
"Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management," 34(1) American Politics Research 22 (2006)
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