By Deep Patel
Streaming services once marketed themselves as the affordable, consumer-friendly alternative to traditional cable. That model is changing. Today, nearly 90% of U.S. households use streaming services, and the average household subscribes to four platforms, often at a growing monthly cost.[1] As media companies confront rising production expenses and market saturation, they are increasingly turning to consolidation strategies, including bundled offerings such as the Disney–Hulu–Max package and proposed joint sports streaming ventures.[2] With consumers paying for multiple subscriptions and experiencing growing subscription fatigue, the streaming marketplace is beginning to resemble the bundled cable ecosystem it once promised to replace. This shift raises a pivotal legal question: when does cooperation among streaming competitors cross the line into anticompetitive conduct under U.S. antitrust law?
Recent developments illustrate how consolidation is reshaping the streaming landscape. Beyond entertainment bundles such as the Disney–Hulu–Max offering, platforms are increasingly packaging premium sports content to attract and retain subscribers. YouTube TV now offers sports add-on bundles that include NFL RedZone and NBA TV, while Apple TV+ has secured exclusive rights to MLS Season Pass.[3] Most notably, Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros. Discovery have announced plans for a joint venture that would combine their live sports rights into a single streaming service.[4] These partnerships reflect a broader industry shift toward fewer standalone offerings and increased coordination among major distribution platforms.
U.S. antitrust law governing competitor coordination is primarily grounded in the Sherman Act.[5] Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.[6] Not all cooperation among competitors is illegal, however, and courts typically evaluate joint ventures under the rule of reason.[7] Under this framework, courts assess whether an arrangement’s anticompetitive harms outweigh its procompetitive benefits by examining factors such as the parties’ market power, the agreement’s likely competitive effects, including whether it raises prices, reduces output, or limits consumer choice, and any procompetitive justifications, such as cost efficiencies or improved product quality.[8] Applied to the streaming industry’s recent consolidation efforts, this analysis raises several potential concerns, including reduced competition among major platforms, coordinated pricing, and increased switching costs for consumers. Streaming companies are likely to argue that these arrangements generate consumer benefits through discounted pricing and expanded access to content.
A central antitrust question in evaluating streaming consolidation will be how courts define the relevant market.[9] The analysis could focus broadly on all video entertainment, more narrowly on subscription streaming services, or even more specifically on premium content such as live sports. The narrower the market definition, the greater the potential antitrust risk for participating firms.[10] Currently, a small number of companies, including Netflix, Amazon, Disney, and Warner Bros. Discovery, account for a significant share of the streaming landscape.[11] Coordination or bundling among these dominant platforms may raise barriers to entry and make it more difficult for smaller or emerging services to compete.
Live sports raise especially acute antitrust concerns. Unlike most streaming content, live sports programming is scarce, time-sensitive, and uniquely valuable to consumers. Joint ventures that combine exclusive sports rights across major media companies could limit competition for licensing and create a “must-buy” platform for viewers, effectively excluding smaller competitors.[12] Antitrust scrutiny has historically been especially attentive to collective control over premium sports content, and courts and regulators have long viewed coordinated sports broadcasting arrangements with caution.[13]
Streaming bundles may produce several potential consumer harms, including reduced service choice, all-or-nothing purchasing pressure, and a return to cable-like pricing structures. At the same time, bundling may offer procompetitive benefits, such as a simplified user experience, lower per-service prices, and expanded access to content. Under the rule of reason, the legality of these arrangements will depend on whether their procompetitive efficiencies outweigh their anticompetitive effects.[14] Federal regulators are already paying close attention. For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has reportedly opened an antitrust investigation into the proposed joint sports streaming venture by Disney, Fox, and Warner Bros. Discovery, signaling heightened scrutiny of coordination among major media competitors.[15] More broadly, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission have signaled increased scrutiny of consolidation among digital platforms and may closely examine exclusive sports distribution partnerships or joint ventures that significantly increase market concentration.[16]
While bundling and joint distribution arrangements are not inherently illegal, increasing coordination among major streaming competitors, especially where exclusive live sports rights are involved, raises significant concerns under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.[17] The outcome will turn on traditional rule of reason balancing, but the stakes are heightened in a market defined by scarce and must-have content. As the streaming industry continues to evolve, regulators and courts will confront a familiar question in a new technological context: when does innovation in distribution cross the line into unlawful restraint of trade?
Deep Patel is a 2L at Vanderbilt Law School pursuing a career in corporate and transactional practice, with academic interests in antitrust and the legal challenges facing digital media and entertainment platforms. Originally from New York City, he is particularly interested in the intersection of law, media, and technology.
[1] See Frankie Karrer, The Average CTV Household Actively Uses Around 4 Streaming Apps, MNTN Research (2024), https://research.mountain.com/trends/the-average-ctv-household-actively-uses-around-4-streaming-apps/.
[2] See Lola Murti, The Streaming Wars Bring a New Discounted Bundle: Disney+, Hulu and Max, NPR (July 25, 2024), https://www.npr.org/2024/07/25/nx-s1-5051841/disney-plus-hulu-max-bundle-streaming.
[3] See Dan Shanoff & Andrew Marchand, YouTube TV Launching Lower-Cost Sports-Only Package of Channels, The Athletic (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/7033336/2026/02/09/youtubetv-sports-plan-espn-unlimited/.
[4] See Jack Baer, Disney, Fox and Warner Bros. Discovery to Launch Massive New Sports Streaming Service This Fall, Yahoo Sports (Feb. 7, 2024), https://sports.yahoo.com/disney-fox-and-warner-bros-discovery-to-launch-massive-new-sports-streaming-service-this-fall-222855590.html.
[5] Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2022).
[6] 15 U.S.C. § 1.
[7] See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Resource Manual § 1, Elements of the Offense (Nov. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/antitrust-resource-manual-1-attorney-generals-policy-statement.
[8] See id.
[9] See id.
[10] See Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Unintended Consequences of Narrower Product Markets and the Overly Leveraged Nature of Philadelphia National Bank (June 30, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1532894/wilson_-_remarks_at_oxford_antitrust_enforcement_symposium_6-30-19_0.pdf.
[11] See Jaspreet Singh & Kritika Lamba, How U.S. Media Firms Stack Up as Netflix and Paramount Clash for Warner Bros, Reuters (Jan. 7, 2026, 6:15 AM CST), https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/warner-bros-netflixs-72-billion-deal-turns-spotlight-performance-media-titans-2025-12-06/.
[12] See Scharon Harding, Does Fubo’s Antitrust Lawsuit Against ESPN, Fox, and WBD Stand a Chance?, Ars Technica (Feb. 22, 2024), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/02/does-fubos-antitrust-lawsuit-against-espn-fox-and-wbd-stand-a-chance/.
[13] See Ben Sperry, Live Sports, Video Competition, and Antitrust, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (May 22, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/live-sports-video-competition-and-antitrust/.
[14] See Bona Law PC, Antitrust Standards of Review: The Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Quick Look Tests (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.bonalaw.com/insights/legal-resources/antitrust-standards-of-review-the-per-se-rule-of-reason-and-quick-look-tests.
[15] See Robert Freedman, DOJ to Scrutinize Disney-Fox-Warner Sports Streaming Deal, Legal Dive (Feb. 16, 2024), https://www.legaldive.com/news/doj-scrutiny-disney-fox-warner-espn-sports-streaming-deal-antitrust-law-blair-levin-diana-moss/707770/.
[16] See id.
[17] 15 U.S.C. § 1.