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Andrew F. Daughety

Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics
Professor of Law

Andrew Daughety's research relating to law focuses on models of settlement and negotiation, models of courts and court systems, products liability and safety, privacy, the market for legal services, litigation funding, and the implications of informal sanctions. He is a co-editor of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, is on the editorial board of The American Law and Economics Review, and an associate editor of the RAND Journal of Economics. He joined the faculty of Vanderbilt's Department of Economics in 1995 after serving as professor of economics and management sciences at the University of Iowa. He began his academic career at Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management, where he was an assistant professor of managerial economics and transportation. He has been a visiting scholar at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; Centre d’Economie et de Finances Internationales, Universite d’Aix-Marseille; California Institute of Technology; the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law; New York University Law School; the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn; the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo; the University of Melbourne; Stanford Law School; the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; the Paris Center for Law and Economics; and an ERID Visitor at Duke University.

Research Interests

Settlement and negotiation, courts and court systems, products liability and safety, privacy, the market for legal services, litigation funding, informal sanctions and plea bargaining

Representative Publications

  • Market Structure, Liability, and Product Safety," forthcoming in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization (Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Parisi, Ed., Oxford University Press) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • “Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases,” forthcoming in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • “Selecting Among Acquitted Defendants:  Procedural Choice and Selective Compensation,” 172 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 113 (2016) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • "The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement," 104 American Economic Review 2552 (2014) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • "Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets," 30 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 371 (2014) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • “Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining,” 81 University of Chicago Law Review 83 (2014) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • “Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory,” Chapter 3 in Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, Edward Elgar Publishing (Jennifer H. Arlen, editor, 2013) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • "Search, Bargaining and Signaling in the Market for Legal Services," 44 RAND Journal of Economics 82 (2013) (with Jennifer Reinganum)
  • "Settlement" in Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, 2nd edition, Volume 8, Chapter 15: Procedural Law & Economics, Elgar Publishing (Chris William Sanchirico, editor, 2012) (with Jennifer Reinganum)