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Jennifer F. Reinganum

E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics
Professor of Law

Jennifer Reinganum's law-related research focuses on models of settlement negotiation, models of courts and court systems, products liability and safety, privacy, the market for legal services, litigation funding, and informal sanctions and plea bargaining. She is a former co-editor of the RAND Journal of Economics and the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and a past president of the American Law and Economics Association. Before joining Vanderbilt University's department of economics in 1995, she served as a professor of economics at the University of Iowa and the California Institute of Technology. She has been a visiting scholar at the University of Chicago; Centre d’Economie et de Finances Internationales, Universite d’Aix-Marseille; California Institute of Technology; the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law; New York University Law School; the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn; the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo; the University of Melbourne; Stanford Law School; the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; the University of Paris II; and an ERID visitor at Duke University.

Research Interests

Settlement negotiation, courts and court systems, products liability and safety, privacy, the market for legal services, litigation funding, and informal sanctions and plea bargaining


Representative Publications

  • Market Structure, Liability, and Product Safety," forthcoming in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization (Luis C. Corchón and Marco A. Marini, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Parisi, Ed., Oxford University Press) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • “Selecting Among Acquitted Defendants:  Procedural Choice and Selective Compensation,” 172 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 113 (2016) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • "The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement," 104 American Economic Review 2552 (2014) (with Andrew F. Daughety)
  • “Informal Sanctions on Prosecutors and Defendants and the Disposition of Criminal Cases,” forthcoming in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (with Andrew Daughety)
  • "Cumulative Harm and Resilient Liability Rules for Product Markets," 30 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 371 (2014) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • “Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement Bargaining,” 81 University of Chicago Law Review 83 (2014) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • “Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory,” in Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, Edward Elgar Publishing (Jennifer H. Arlen, editor; 2013) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • "Search, Bargaining, and Signalling in the Market for Legal Services," 44 RAND Journal of Economics 82 (2013) (with Andrew Daughety)
  • "A Dynamic Model of Lawsuit Joinder and Settlement," 42 RAND Journal of Economics 471 (2011) (with Andrew Daughety)